How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1996
Volume: 104
Issue: 4
Pages: 764-90

Authors (4)

Barberis, Nicholas (not in RePEc) Maxim Boycko (Harvard University) Andrei Shleifer (Harvard University) Natalia Tsukanova (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The authors use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as major renovation, a change in suppliers, an increase in the hours stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role new human capital plays in economic transformation. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:104:y:1996:i:4:p:764-90
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24