Monitoring for Worker Quality

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 35
Issue: 3
Pages: 755 - 785

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Much nonmanagerial work is routine, with all workers having similar output most of the time. However, failure to address occasional challenges can be very costly, and consequently easily detected, while challenges handled well pass unnoticed. We analyze job assignment and worker monitoring for such "guardian" jobs. If monitoring costs are positive but small, monitoring is nonmonotonic in the firm's belief about the probability that a worker is good. The model explains several empirical regularities regarding nonmanagerial internal labor markets: low use of performance pay, seniority pay, rare demotions, wage ceilings within grade, and wage jumps at promotion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/690713
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24