Caseworker's discretion and the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 183
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper we focus on the role of caseworkers in the assignment and take-up of welfare-to-work programs. We conduct a field experiment that generates exogenous variation in the assignment of caseworkers to different policy regimes. The experiment allows us to provide evidence on the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs and to study how caseworkers exploit their discretion in assigning these programs to welfare recipients. We find substantial heterogeneity in how caseworkers assign welfare-to-work programs. Participation in the experiment and learning about the effectiveness of the different programs do not induce caseworkers to focus more on the effective programs. Obtaining knowledge about welfare-to-work programs is thus not enough to improve policy, also effort on implementation is required.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:183:y:2020:i:c:s0047272719301410
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24