Property Rights and Wages: The Case of Nursing Homes

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Human Resources
Year: 1983
Volume: 18
Issue: 2

Authors (3)

George J. Borjas (Harvard University) H. E. Frech III (not in RePEc) Paul B. Ginsburg (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper we develop the implications of the property rights theory of the firm for wage determination and test the model using data from the U.S. nursing home industry. The main theoretical prediction is that any attenuation of property rights will lead to higher wage rates for the firm's employees. The empirical evidence indicates that, indeed, profit-maximizing nursing homes do pay the lowest wage rates (for given quality labor), and that the stronger the cost-minimizing incentives provided by Medicaid reimbursement programs, the lower the wage rate paid by these nursing homes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:uwp:jhriss:v:18:y:1983:i:2:p:231-246
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24