Cartel stability with quality-anchored buyers

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2025
Volume: 254
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Bos, Iwan (Maastricht University) Cesi, Berardino (not in RePEc) Marini, Marco A. ("Sapienza" Università di Roma)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

View Full Article View on IDEAS/RePEc

Abstract

This note examines cartel stability in a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality-anchored buyers. It is shown that such buyers are a facilitating factor for collusion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:254:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525002861
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24