Bank competition and household privacy in a digital payment monopoly

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 166
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Agur, Itai (International Monetary Fund (I...) Ari, Anil (not in RePEc) Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Lenders can exploit households’ payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and attaining better credit conditions. We study how introducing an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects households’ cash use, credit access, and welfare. A tech monopolist controls the intrusiveness of the new payment method and manipulates information asymmetries among households and oligopolistic banks to extract data contracts that are more lucrative than lending on its own. The laissez-faire equilibrium entails a digital payment vehicle that is more intrusive than socially optimal, providing a rationale for regulation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:166:y:2025:i:c:s0304405x25000273
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24