Vendettas

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2014
Volume: 6
Issue: 2
Pages: 93-130

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job, by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any immediate gain from aggression. Negative emotions are important and interact with the economic setting to produce large social inefficiencies. Allowing cooling off periods reduces aggression.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:6:y:2014:i:2:p:93-130
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24