THE PARETO PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMAL INEQUALITY

B-Tier
Journal: International Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 53
Issue: 2
Pages: 593-608

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value judgments. In particular, it is generally thought that it can accommodate different degrees of inequality aversion. We show that this is generally not true in time‐consistent intertemporal models where some uncertainty prevails.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:2:p:593-608
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24