The Tax Gradient: Spatial Aspects of Fiscal Competition

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Year: 2015
Volume: 7
Issue: 2
Pages: 1-29

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

State borders create a discontinuous tax treatment of retail sales. In a Nash game, local tax rates will be higher on the low state tax side of a border. Local taxes will decrease from the nearest high-tax border and increase from the low-tax border. Using driving time from state borders and all local sales tax rates, local tax rates on the low tax side of the border are 1.25 percentage points higher, reducing the differential in state tax rates by over three-quarters. A ten minute increase in driving time from the nearest high-tax state lowers a border town's local tax rate by 6 percent. (JEL H25, H71, H73, H77)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejpol:v:7:y:2015:i:2:p:1-29
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24