Duality of welfare and profit maximization

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 113
Issue: 3
Pages: 215-217

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Many economists are aware that the conditions for the efficiency and monopolization in a partial equilibrium framework are the extremes of the Ramsey–Boiteux formula when the Lagrange multiplier for the budget varies. We formalize the duality existing between the welfarist and monopolist constrained maximization programs by proving the following “folk theorem”: maxWelfares.t.profit≥fixed cost⇔maxProfits.t.output≥minimum.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:3:p:215-217
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24