Does the trust game measure trust?

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 115
Issue: 1
Pages: 20-23

Authors (2)

Brülhart, Marius (Université de Lausanne) Usunier, Jean-Claude (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Could altruism explain observed choices in the standard trust game? With dominant altruism, trustors would give more to poor trustees. However, we find trustors to give no more to poor than to rich trustees, confirming trust as the dominant motivation for “trust like” choices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:1:p:20-23
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24