Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
The goal of this paper is to bring some unity to the theoretical side of the debate on internalization of airport congestion by showing that all the literature's theoretical results can be derived within one simple and unified framework. The analysis starts by replicating the results of Brueckner [Brueckner, J.K., 2002. Airport congestion when carriers have market power. American Economic Review 92, 1357-1375], who showed that, because airlines behaving in Cournot fashion internalize congestion, they should be charged low congestion tolls. The analysis then validates the findings of Daniel [Daniel, J.I., 1995. Congestion pricing and capacity of large hub airports: A bottleneck model with stochastic queues. Econometrica 63, 327-370], who argued that larger atomistic tolls are required in a model where a Stackelberg leader interacts with competitive fringe airlines. However, it is shown that this result only holds approximately when the carriers' outputs are imperfect substitutes.