Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2025
Volume: 251
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Bruttel, Lisa (Universität Potsdam) Eisenkopf, Gerald (not in RePEc) Nithammer, Juri (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a Public Good experiment with an elected first-mover, we study how leadership candidates’ statements affect their election and followers’ contributions. Explicitly emphasizing efficiency and fairness boosts votes and contributions, but leader contributions remain the strongest predictor of follower behavior.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:251:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001545
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24