Optimal Expectations

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2005
Volume: 95
Issue: 4
Pages: 1092-1118

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Forward-looking agents care about expected future utility flows, and hence have higher current felicity if they are optimistic. This paper studies utility-based biases in beliefs by supposing that beliefs maximize average felicity, optimally balancing this benefit of optimism against the costs of worse decision making. A small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains in anticipatory utility and only second-order costs in realized outcomes. In a portfolio choice example, investors overestimate their return and exhibit a preference for skewness; in general equilibrium, investors' prior beliefs are endogenously heterogeneous. In a consumption-saving example, consumers are both overconfident and overoptimistic.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:1092-1118
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24