Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 1987
Volume: 35
Issue: 4
Pages: 457-82

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Movements in total quantity and in quality-adjusted price suggest a supply-side shock in the American automobile market in 1955. This paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct, a price war. The key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation. In nonnested (Cox) tests of hypotheses, a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956, while a competitive solution holds in 1955. The result does not appear to be an artifact, since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:35:y:1987:i:4:p:457-82
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24