Sequential Parimutuel Betting in the Laboratory

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Year: 2004
Volume: 28
Issue: 2
Pages: 165-186

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper investigates parimutuel betting in the laboratory. Our experimental design relies on a simple sequential betting game where equilibrium strategies are characterized according to objective probabilities, the number of bettors, and publicly observable odds. The empirically well-documented phenomenon referred to as the "favorite-longshot bias" is observed in two of our three treatments. We offer a theoretical explanation of the subjects' behavior which relies on rank-dependent expected utility and pessimistic expectations about future bets.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:jrisku:v:28:y:2004:i:2:p:165-186
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24