A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2018
Volume: 164
Issue: C
Pages: 117-120

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:164:y:2018:i:c:p:117-120
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24