The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets.

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 1987
Volume: 69
Issue: 1
Pages: 24-32

Authors (3)

Brannman, Lance Klein, J Douglass (not in RePEc) Weiss, Leonard W (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Bidding theory predicts low er selling winning bids (higher buying winning bids) as numbers of bidders incre ase. Alternative versions predict that winning bids fall (rise) with the second order statistic, the maximum order statistic, or 1/N. The authors test these pre dictions using data on underwriters' spreads on tax exempt bonds, offshore oil t racts, and National Forest timber. They estimate winning bids using general vari ables for the product and dummies for 1, 2, . . .11 bidders. In all cases mor e bidders meansignificantly lower (selling) winning bids. The expected maximum order statistic fits better than either the second order statistic or1/N, in te n out of twelve cases. Copyright 1987 by MIT Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:69:y:1987:i:1:p:24-32
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24