Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in Asymmetric Oral Auctions

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 2000
Volume: 82
Issue: 2
Pages: 283-290

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

From bidding data, we estimate the underlying value distribution for Forest Service timber. We find that bidder values decrease $2/mbf (thousand board feet) with each mile from the tract and that small firms (fewer than 500 employees) have values that are $72/mbf lower than large firms. The empirical value distribution is used to simulate various hypothetical scenarios designed to inform public policy. The most anticompetitive mergers raise price by less than 3%, and a 4% decline in marginal costs through greater merger efficiencies is enough to offset a 1% anticompetitive price increase. Eliminating the SBA set-aside program would raise timber revenues by 15%. A policy of granting bidding preferences to small and more-distant bidders would raise revenue by approximately one-tenth of one percent. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:82:y:2000:i:2:p:283-290
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24