Disability insurance screening and worker health

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Health Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 101
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide new evidence on the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force participation, program spillovers, and worker health. To do so, we analyze Austrian workers after a workplace injury that experience differential levels of application screening. We find that when workers face stricter screening, they are more likely to remain in the labor force. However, we estimate no statistical differences in any physical or mental health outcomes, and can rule out large effects on overall healthcare utilization. Our findings imply that imposing stricter DI screening can yield large fiscal benefits, on the margin.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jhecon:v:101:y:2025:i:c:s0167629625000207
Journal Field
Health
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24