Herding and Speculation in the Crude Oil Market

B-Tier
Journal: The Energy Journal
Year: 2013
Volume: 34
Issue: 3
Pages: 83-104

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine whether herding among speculators in U.S. crude oil futures markets affects market prices and volatility. Using detailed data on the positions of hedge funds and swap dealers from 2005-2009, we find little evidence that herding destabilizes the crude oil futures market. To the contrary, herding among speculative traders is negatively correlated with contemporaneous volatility and does not lead next-day volatility. Our impulse-response analysis shows that market regulators should monitor herding since a shock to herding among all groups may lead to price changes, and, in the case of hedge funds, may lead to increased volatility. Interestingly, however, increased swap dealer herding actually dampens crude oil price volatility.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:sae:enejou:v:34:y:2013:i:3:p:83-104
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24