The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 120
Issue: C
Pages: 132-143

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We develop a graphical, non-analytical version of the two-person beauty contest game to study the developmental trajectory of instinctive behavior and learning from kindergarten to adulthood. These are captured by observing behavior when the game is played in two consecutive trials. We find that equilibrium behavior in the first trial increases significantly between 5 and 10 years of age (from 17.9% to 61.4%) and stabilizes afterwards. Children of all ages learn to play the equilibrium, especially when they observe an equilibrium choice by the rival. Our younger children are the weakest learners mainly because they are less frequently paired with rivals who play at equilibrium. Finally, the choice process data suggests that participants who play at equilibrium in the second trial are also performing fewer steps before reaching a decision, indicating that they are less hesitant about their strategy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:132-143
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25