CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL: THE CASE OF THE DESIGNATED HITTER AND HIT BATTERS

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Inquiry
Year: 2007
Volume: 45
Issue: 1
Pages: 131-144

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Past studies have found a positive correlation between the use of the designated hitter in baseball and hit batters, but the reason for this is debatable. Using a new micro‐level data set of individual plate appearances, we control for detailed cost‐benefit attributes that affect the decision calculus of the pitcher to isolate the deterrent impact of requiring the pitcher to bat. We find that pitchers hit batters strategically, and the deterrent effect of requiring pitchers to bat explains 60%–80% of the difference in hit batsmen between leagues. We also identify evidence of direct retaliation against plunking pitchers. (JEL D81, KC42, L83)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:ecinqu:v:45:y:2007:i:1:p:131-144
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25