Securitization bubbles: Structured finance with disagreement about default risk

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 127
Issue: 3
Pages: 505-518

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

An additional reason for the structured finance boom of the 2000s may have been disagreement about default risk of collateral assets. When risk-neutral investors disagree about average default probabilities, structuring collateral cash flow raises prices by concentrating optimists’ demand on risky tranches. With disagreement about default correlation, low-correlation investors believe in diversification and pay high prices for senior tranches they deem riskless. High-correlation investors value junior tranches they expect to pay whenever aggregate conditions are good. Risk aversion and short selling through credit default swaps reduce the prices of both pass-through and structured securitizations but may increase the return to tranching.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:3:p:505-518
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25