Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2014
Volume: 158
Issue: 3
Pages: 525-539

Authors (3)

Steven Brams (New York University) Gustavo Camilo (not in RePEc) Alexandra Franz (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally borne out by the 5–4 decisions, whereas the predictions of the Martin-Quinn (Political Analysis 10(2):134–153, 2002 ) model, which assumes a single underlying dimension along which the justices can be ordered, are not. The present model also provides insight into the dynamic process by which subcoalitions build up into majority coalitions and, in addition, identifies “kingmakers” and “leaders” on the natural courts. Furthermore, it provides evidence, from coalitional memberships, that a few justices shifted over time from one ideological camp to another. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:158:y:2014:i:3:p:525-539
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25