Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2011
Volume: 119
Issue: 5
Pages: 982 - 1013

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Internal competition may motivate worker effort, yet the benefits of competition may depend critically on workers' relative abilities: large skill differences may reduce efforts. I use panel data from professional golf tournaments and find that the presence of a superstar is associated with lower performance. On average, golfers' first-round scores are approximately 0.2 strokes worse when Tiger Woods participates relative to when Woods is absent. The overall tournament effect is 0.8 strokes. The adverse superstar effect varies with the quality of Woods's play. There is no evidence that reduced performance is attributable to media attention intensity or risky strategy adoption.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/663306
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25