Competition in Pricing Algorithms

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2023
Volume: 15
Issue: 2
Pages: 109-56

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We document new facts about pricing technology using high-frequency data, and we examine the implications for competition. Some online retailers employ technology that allows for more frequent price changes and automated responses to price changes by rivals. Motivated by these facts, we consider a model in which firms can differ in pricing frequency and choose pricing algorithms that are a function of rivals' prices. In competitive (Markov perfect) equilibrium, the introduction of simple pricing algorithms can increase price levels, generate price dispersion, and exacerbate the price effects of mergers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:2:p:109-56
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25