Payroll Taxes, Social Insurance, and Business Cycles

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of the European Economic Association
Year: 2016
Volume: 14
Issue: 2
Pages: 438-467

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Payroll taxes represent a major distortionary influence of governments on labor markets. This paper examines the role of time-varying payroll taxes and the social safety net for cyclical fluctuations in a nonmonetary economy with labor market frictions and unemployment insurance, when the latter is only imperfectly related to search effort. A balanced social insurance budget induces countercyclical payroll taxation, renders gross wages more rigid over the cycle and strengthens the model's endogenous propagation mechanism. For conventional calibrations, the model generates a negatively sloped Beveridge curve and countercyclical unemployment as well as substantial volatility and persistence of vacancies and unemployment.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:jeurec:v:14:y:2016:i:2:p:438-467.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25