All voting is strategic

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2006
Volume: 129
Issue: 1
Pages: 159-167

Authors (2)

James Buchanan Yong Yoon (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

All voting is strategic because the shared outcomes are note within the choice set of any voter, the elements of which can only be strategies. Voting behavior need not re- flect the individual's ordering of outcomes, and the conventional distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting is misguided. In voting choice, the ordinal ranking of outcomes must be supplemented by intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among these outcomes and also by predictions concerning the behavior of other participants in the nexus of interdependence. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:1:p:159-167
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25