Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2012
Volume: 153
Issue: 1
Pages: 9-16

Authors (2)

J. Buchanan Y. Yoon (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In formal analysis of collective action, usually attention is focused on problems arising in aggregating the separate orderings into coherent collective results. Our concern is not with the aggregation problem. Instead, our focus is on the particular characteristics of the alternatives themselves. Alternatives in collective actions are fundamentally different from alternatives in market choice (apples and oranges). Regardless of motivation, collectivization forces attention on the distribution of benefits and costs among others in the sharing community. We first examine the formal structure of alternatives as these are confronted by a participant in the collective action. The second feature involves distributional patterns made necessary by collectivization. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:1:p:9-16
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25