The costs of collectivization, per se

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2014
Volume: 159
Issue: 3
Pages: 321-326

Authors (2)

James Buchanan Yong Yoon (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The question of collectivization becomes relevant in the post-financial crisis years as characterized by growing criticism of market organization. Collectivization, the social structure distinguishable from the market or central planning agency, can be costly from overspending. In our analytical framework, the political order remains polycentric. The most widely acceptable institutional solution may be budgetary outlay sufficient to meet all demand, and especially when it is recognized that public criticism of market alternatives is often concentrated on moral goods, e.g., health care. The excess burden of collectivization, per se, is the excess of costs over benefits if the collectivity meets individual demand for the good beyond plausible efficiency levels. The costs of collectivization, per se, can be reduced by separated budgets, showing both revenue and outlay for individual budgetary line items, that bring collective spending decisions closer to the accompanying levy of taxes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:3:p:321-326
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25