Debt, equity, and information

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 50
Issue: C
Pages: 54-62

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Most firms issue financial assets such as debt or equity (e.g. bonds or stock) to outside investors. While these financial assets differ greatly in their characteristics, their diversity has received little attention in the literature. Filling this important gap in the literature, this paper views debt and equity as financial contracts, and asks why they are optimal instead of other financial contracts. By endogenizing the bankruptcy process, this paper shows how debt and equity arise as a consequence of an optimal allocation of cash-flow rights and monitoring rights, and how equity leads to dividend signaling.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:50:y:2014:i:c:p:54-62
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25