'Acting Wife': Marriage Market Incentives and Labor Market Investments

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 107
Issue: 11
Pages: 3288-3319

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real-stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences. Other groups' responses were unaffected by peer observability. A second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:11:p:3288-3319
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25