The Schooling Decision: Family Preferences, Intergenerational Conflict, and Moral Hazard in the Brazilian Favelas

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2012
Volume: 120
Issue: 3
Pages: 359 - 397

Authors (2)

Leonardo Bursztyn (University of Chicago) Lucas C. Coffman (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper experimentally analyzes the schooling decisions of poor households in urban Brazil. We elicit parents' choices between monthly government transfers conditional on their adolescent child attending school and guaranteed, unconditional transfers of varying sizes. In the baseline treatment, an overwhelming majority of parents prefer conditional transfers to larger unconditional transfers. However, few parents prefer conditional payments if they are offered text message notifications whenever their child misses school. These findings suggest important intergenerational conflicts in these schooling decisions, a lack of parental control and observability of school attendance, and an additional rationale for conditional cash transfer programs--the monitoring they provide.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/666746
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25