Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2014
Volume: 84
Issue: C
Pages: 39-57

Authors (2)

Burchardi, Konrad B. (Stockholms Universitet) Penczynski, Stefan P. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly different from 50, and almost 60% of higher level players start their reasoning from a level-0 belief of exactly 50. We also estimate that around one third of the participants play non-strategically. The non-strategic level-0 actions are not uniformly distributed.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:84:y:2014:i:c:p:39-57
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25