Tax competition effects of a minimum tax rate: Empirical evidence from German municipalities

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 236
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Buettner, Thiess (not in RePEc) Poehnlein, Maximilian (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper explores the effects of a federal law that obligates previously unregulated municipalities in Germany to set a minimum tax rate on firms’ taxable profits. In particular, we examine the tax-policy response of municipalities that compete locally with “tax-haven municipalities”, i.e.municipalities that originally have set lower and, in some cases, even zero tax rates. The analysis distinguishes treated and not-treated municipalities based on their distance to a tax-haven. Our results show that the majority of municipalities do not change their tax policy. Apart from the tax-havens, only high-tax municipalities show a response – they reduce the business tax rate without experiencing a decline in tax revenues.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:236:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724000847
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25