On non-monotonic strategic reasoning

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 120
Issue: C
Pages: 209-224

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Strong-Δ-Rationalizability introduces first-order belief restrictions in the analysis of forward induction reasoning. Without actual restrictions, it coincides with Strong Rationalizability (Battigalli, 2003; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003). These solution concepts are based on the notion of strong belief (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). The non-monotonicity of strong belief implies that the predictions of Strong-Δ-Rationalizability can be inconsistent with Strong Rationalizability. I show that Strong-Δ-Rationalizability refines Strong Rationalizability in terms of outcomes when the restrictions correspond to belief in a distribution over terminal nodes. Moreover, under such restrictions, the epistemic priority between rationality and belief restrictions is irrelevant for the predicted outcomes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:209-224
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25