Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
Previous studies have shown that pro‐social leaders cooperate, on average, more than pro‐self leaders in social dilemmas. It can, thus, be beneficial for the group to have a pro‐social leader. In this paper we analyze the consequences of a leader informing followers that they are pro‐social (or pro‐self). In doing so, we compare a setting in which the leader's type is truthfully revealed to settings where the leader can ‘hide’ or ‘lie’ about their pro‐sociality. We find that a leader saying they are pro‐social boosts efficiency, even if the signal is not fully credible. Cooperation is highest in a truth setting with a pro‐social leader. We demonstrate that these results are consistent with a belief‐based model of social preference in which the stated type of the leader changes the frame of reference for followers.