A survey of belief-based guilt aversion in trust and dictator games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2019
Volume: 167
Issue: C
Pages: 430-444

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The evidence for belief-based guilt aversion is reviewed with a particular focus on trust games and dictator games. By way of comparison an alternative model to belief-based guilt aversion is proposed which is based on an internalized norm. We show that the experimental evidence to date is consistent with belief-based guilt aversion but that it is difficult to distinguish one model from another. The review compares the many different approaches that have been used to elicit beliefs. It also looks at the role of exposure and communication.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:167:y:2019:i:c:p:430-444
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25