Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 79
Issue: C
Pages: 163-180

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Waldʼs pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of equilibria in infinite games. These conditions are typically of topological nature and are rarely applicable to countable games. Here we establish an existence result for the equilibrium of countable games when the strategy sets are a countable group, the payoffs are functions of the group operation, and mixed strategies are not requested to be σ-additive. As a byproduct we show that if finitely additive mixed strategies are allowed, then Waldʼs game admits an equilibrium. Finally we extend the main results to uncountable games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:79:y:2013:i:c:p:163-180
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25