Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
In a two-population evolutionary game we analyze the interaction between individuals belonging to two populations with the same strategy set but different payoffs. A game is played among individuals in the two populations. They imitate agents belonging to the same and also the alternative population. When a revising agent is matched with someone in the alternative population who plays differently, his expected payoff and the observed payoff of his partner diverge. Hence, he conjectures the payoff from switching to the other strategy by weighing what he expected and what he observes. The evolutionary dynamics has a unique locally asymptotically stable fixed point, which typically differs from the evolutionary stable equilibrium without inter-population imitation. For a collective action game we analyze to what extent the compliance rate and the social welfare differ from the Nash equilibrium, and how these gaps depend on the confidence that agents assign to what they see.