On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 50
Issue: C
Pages: 177-186

Authors (2)

Carvajal, Andrés (University of California-Davis) González, Natalia (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

Empirical tests of the Nash bargaining solution (NBS, hereafter) are developed under different hypotheses about the behavior of disagreement utility levels.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:50:y:2014:i:c:p:177-186
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25