Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
The statistical findings of this study support the economic theory of representative voting. In general, producer and consumer groups influence representative voting behavior as expected. The findings suggest that legislators act “rationally” when confronted by competing lobbying groups. The consistently positive and highly significant influence of MSB share which serves to measure MSB influencerelative to the other bank groups indicates that legislators appear to consider opportunity costs in their decision-making calculus. The findings are also consistent with the Downs-Stigler hypothesis that producer-lobbyist groups have a comparative advantage over consumer-voters in the marketplace for legislative profits. The larger β-coefficient for MSB share than for the consumer-voter variables indicates that MSB share was a more influential determinant of legislators' voting behavior. The mixed statistical results for the consumer-voter variables leads one to place less confidence in the importance of their influence in determining legislators' voting preferences. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1977