Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 47
Issue: 4-5
Pages: 531-540

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of trembling-hand perfection fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:531-540
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25