THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 58
Issue: 1
Pages: 54-78

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the importance of eBay's reputation mechanism. We find that, when a seller first receives negative feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5% to a negative 8%; subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the first one and don't have nearly as much impact as the first one. We also find that a seller is more likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:1:p:54-78
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25