Locus of control and the preference for agency

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2024
Volume: 165
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Caliendo, Marco (Universität Potsdam) Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. (not in RePEc) Silva-Goncalves, Juliana (not in RePEc) Uhlendorff, Arne (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und...)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how locus of control operates through people’s preferences and beliefs to influence their decisions. Using the principal–agent setting of the delegation game, we test four key channels that conceptually link locus of control to decision-making: (i) preference for agency, (ii) optimism and (iii) confidence regarding the return to effort, and (iv) illusion of control. Knowing the return and cost of stated effort, principals either retain or delegate the right to make an investment decision that generates payoffs for themselves and their agents. Extending the game to the context in which the return to stated effort is unknown allows us to explicitly study the relationship between locus of control and beliefs about the return to effort. We find that internal locus of control is linked to the preference for agency, an effect that is driven by women. We find no evidence that locus of control influences optimism and confidence about the return to stated effort, or that it operates through an illusion of control.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:165:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124000667
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25