Take the money and run: Political turnover, rent-seeking and economic growth

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2010
Volume: 76
Issue: 2
Pages: 406-412

Authors (2)

Caporale, Tony (Ohio University) Leirer, Jonathan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We find a negative and significant relationship between gubernatorial turnover and U.S. state economic growth. Although our finding of an inverse relationship between growth and political instability may seem to contradict Olson's (1982a) famous hypothesis regarding the growth retarding nature of political stability, such constitutional political changes were not primarily what Olson had in mind. We argue that enhanced political turnover is associated with more rent-seeking since payoffs to focusing on special interest (redistributive) policies vs. general (growth enhancing) ones are greater for less durable regimes. Therefore, we interpret our evidence as supportive of Olson's broader argument concerning the negative affect of rent-seeking behavior on growth.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:76:y:2010:i:2:p:406-412
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25