On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2005
Volume: 8
Issue: 2
Pages: 107-115

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:2:p:107-115
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25