Endogenous Market Formation and Monetary Trade: An Experiment

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of the European Economic Association
Year: 2020
Volume: 18
Issue: 3
Pages: 1553-1588

Authors (3)

Gabriele Camera (Chapman University) Dror Goldberg (not in RePEc) Avi WeissBar-Ilan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The theory of money assumes decentralized bilateral exchange and excludes centralized multilateral exchange. However, endogenizing the exchange process is critical for understanding the conditions that support the use of money. We develop a “traveling game” to study the emergence of decentralized and centralized exchange, theoretically and experimentally. Players located on separate islands can either trade locally, or pay a cost to trade elsewhere, so decentralized and centralized markets can both emerge in equilibrium. The former minimize trade costs through monetary exchange; the latter maximizes overall surplus through nonmonetary exchange. Monetary trade emerges when coordination is problematic, whereas centralized trade emerges otherwise. This shows that to understand the emergence of money it is important to amend standard theory such that the market structure is endogenized.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:jeurec:v:18:y:2020:i:3:p:1553-1588.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25