Dynamic directed search

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2016
Volume: 62
Issue: 1
Pages: 131-154

Authors (2)

Gabriele Camera (Chapman University) Jaehong Kim (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract The directed search model (Peters 52(5):1117–1127, 1984) is static; its dynamic extensions typically restrict strategies, often assuming price or match commitments. We lift such restrictions to study equilibrium when search can be directed over time, without constraints and at no cost. In equilibrium, trade frictions arise endogenously, and price commitments, if they do exist, are self-enforcing. In contrast to the typical model, there exists a continuum of equilibria that exhibit trade frictions. These equilibria support any price above the static price, including monopoly pricing in arbitrarily large markets. Dispersion in posted prices can naturally arise as temporary or permanent phenomenon despite the absence of preexisting heterogeneity.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:62:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-015-0872-0
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25